Not upheld: Fraud reimbursement (APP scams) complaint against Monzo Bank Limited

Decision detail

Summary

Miss D was victim of a sophisticated romance scam between June 2024 and October 2025, losing £82,803.35 across three banks, with £42,416.81 processed through Monzo. She made six payments from her Monzo account after being deceived by a scammer impersonating an American actor into believing they were in a genuine romantic relationship. While the ombudsman found that Monzo should have questioned payment 4 as suspicious (large amount, out of character, to new payee, international), it concluded that such intervention would not have prevented the loss given Miss D's profound belief in the scammer, evidenced by pension withdrawals, false statements to financial institutions, and deliberate switching to Monzo after Bank N's intervention. The complaint was not upheld as the ombudsman was not persuaded that proportionate intervention would have resonated with Miss D, who only discovered the scam when the scammer's story contradicted verifiable social media evidence.

The Ombudsman's reasoning

While Monzo failed to identify payment 4 as suspicious and should have intervened through human contact before processing, the ombudsman concluded that proportionate intervention would not have prevented Miss D's loss. The key finding was that Miss D's belief in the scammer was so complete that she would not have been persuaded by scam warnings or fraud education. This conclusion was supported by: (1) Miss D's demonstrated commitment evidenced by pension withdrawals and cancelled holiday plans; (2) her willingness to provide false information to banks when questioned; (3) her closure of Bank N account and move to Monzo after Bank N's intervention, suggesting deliberate avoidance of detection; (4) the sophisticated nature of the scam with psychological manipulation and coaching on what to say; and (5) the fact that Miss D only realised the scam when the scammer's story contradicted verifiable social media evidence. The ombudsman found that even if Monzo had intervened on payment 4, Miss D would likely have proceeded regardless. International payments were outside the scope of CRM Code and Reimbursement Rules protections. Miss D's vulnerability, while sympathetic, was unknown to Monzo and did not change the analysis that intervention would have been unsuccessful.

How this compares

Source

Read the original decision on the Financial Ombudsman Service website