Not upheld: scam - Authorised Push Payment (APP) / irresponsible lending / failure to prevent fraud complaint against Bank of Scotland plc trading as Halifax
Financial Ombudsman decision DRN-6329120 of 2026-05-08T00:00:00+00:00. scam - Authorised Push Payment (APP) / irresponsible lending / failure to prevent fraud complaint against Bank of Scotland plc trading as Halifax. Outcome: Not upheld.
Decision detail
| Reference | DRN-6329120 |
|---|---|
| Decision date | 2026-05-08T00:00:00+00:00 |
| Firm | Bank of Scotland plc trading as Halifax |
| Product | current account |
| Claim type | scam - Authorised Push Payment (APP) / irresponsible lending / failure to prevent fraud |
| Outcome | Not upheld |
| Remedy | None. The complaint was not upheld. Halifax was not directed to refund Mr D's loss. |
Summary
Mr D complained that Halifax should refund £14,538.09 he lost to a scam between 29 March and 2 April 2025. He made 11 payments from his Halifax account to an account at another provider in his own name, from which he sent funds to a scammer posing as a remote job opportunity provider. Halifax intervened on nine occasions, asking specific questions about payment purposes and providing scam warnings. However, Mr D provided false or misleading answers, claiming payments were for bills and denying any third-party involvement. The ombudsman found Halifax's interventions were reasonable and proportionate, and that even if further intervention had occurred, it would not have prevented the loss because Mr D would have continued to provide false answers. The complaint was not upheld.
The Ombudsman's reasoning
The ombudsman found that Halifax took reasonable and proportionate steps to intervene through nine phone calls where they asked specific questions about payment purposes and provided scam warnings. Crucially, Mr D provided false or misleading answers, denying involvement with third parties and claiming payments were for bills or transfers to his own account. The ombudsman applied the causation test: even if Halifax should have intervened further, such intervention would not have prevented the loss because Mr D would have continued to provide false answers and deny the scammer's involvement. Additionally, because payments were sent to an account in Mr D's own name (rather than directly to an unknown third party), the risk profile was lower and proportionate intervention took a different form. The ombudsman noted that Mr D's vulnerabilities were not apparent from the calls, as he acknowledged warnings and claimed to understand the risks. The ombudsman also found insufficient evidence directly linking the payments to the scam (the scam chats referenced conversations between Mr D's father and the scammer, not Mr D himself).
How this compares
| Group | Decisions | Uphold rate |
|---|---|---|
| Bank of Scotland plc trading as Halifax, all decisions | 143 | 9% |
Source
Read the original decision on the Financial Ombudsman Service website