Partially upheld: scam / authorised push payment (APP) fraud - refund claim and firm's duty to prevent fraud complaint against Revolut Ltd
Financial Ombudsman decision DRN-6415883 of 2026-06-10T00:00:00+00:00. scam / authorised push payment (APP) fraud - refund claim and firm's duty to prevent fraud complaint against Revolut Ltd. Outcome: Partially upheld.
Decision detail
| Reference | DRN-6415883 |
|---|---|
| Decision date | 2026-06-10T00:00:00+00:00 |
| Firm | Revolut Ltd |
| Product | Current account |
| Claim type | scam / authorised push payment (APP) fraud - refund claim and firm's duty to prevent fraud |
| Outcome | Partially upheld |
| Remedy | Revolut Ltd directed to: (1) Refund Mrs J a further £2,242.72 in relation to Payment Three (total reimbursement of £15,140 less £100 excess, with £12,897.28 already paid); (2) Pay £100 compensation for distress and inconvenience caused by delays in handling the scam claim. |
Summary
Mrs J invested £61,810 across three payments with company S, which claimed to offer government-backed social housing investments. S ceased operating in early 2025 after running a sophisticated scam funded by new investor payments rather than actual returns. Revolut initially refunded only £4,020 for Payment Three under the FPS Reimbursement Rules. The ombudsman found that while Revolut should have warned Mrs J about the first payment as an unusual high-value transaction, the scam was too sophisticated to have been prevented by such warnings, particularly given Mrs J's personal verification of returns from a trusted friend and the use of a genuine regulated law firm. The ombudsman upheld the complaint for Payment Three, directing Revolut to refund £2,242.72 more (calculating loss based on contract-specific returns rather than proportional allocation) and pay £100 compensation for service delays, but rejected refund claims for Payments One and Two as they pre-dated the FPS Reimbursement Rules.
The Ombudsman's reasoning
The ombudsman found that while Revolut should have taken further steps to assess and warn Mrs J about scam risks on the first payment, the scam was too sophisticated and well-executed for such warnings to have likely prevented her loss. The personal recommendation from a trusted friend combined with verified returns and the use of a genuine regulated law firm would have made it difficult for Revolut to uncover the fraud. Payments One and Two pre-date the FPS Reimbursement Rules and Revolut was not a signatory to the voluntary CRM code, so no reimbursement scheme applies to these. For Payment Three, which is covered by the FPS Reimbursement Rules, the ombudsman determined that returns should be assigned based on the specific investment contracts rather than spread proportionately, as each payment had its own contract with defined returns.
How this compares
| Group | Decisions | Uphold rate |
|---|---|---|
| Revolut Ltd, all decisions | 3,790 | 18% |
| Current account, all decisions | 45,590 | 19% |
Source
Read the original decision on the Financial Ombudsman Service website