Not upheld: scam reimbursement - Authorised Push Payment (APP) fraud complaint against Barclays Bank UK PLC
Financial Ombudsman decision DRN-6398809 of 2026-06-05T00:00:00+00:00. scam reimbursement - Authorised Push Payment (APP) fraud complaint against Barclays Bank UK PLC. Outcome: Not upheld.
Decision detail
| Reference | DRN-6398809 |
|---|---|
| Decision date | 2026-06-05T00:00:00+00:00 |
| Firm | Barclays Bank UK PLC |
| Product | Current account |
| Claim type | scam reimbursement - Authorised Push Payment (APP) fraud |
| Outcome | Not upheld |
| Remedy | None. The complaint is not upheld and Barclays is not required to take any further action or provide any reimbursement. |
Summary
Ms A complained that Barclays Bank UK PLC should reimburse her for losses suffered when she fell victim to a crypto investment scam. She had made multiple payments in 2024 from her Barclays account to an Electronic Money Remittance (EMI) provider account in her own name, intending to invest in what she believed was a genuine opportunity. Barclays and the EMI provider both conducted interventions with scam warnings, but Ms A provided inaccurate information about the purpose of the payments and was being coached by the scammer on how to respond to bank inquiries. The ombudsman found that while Barclays took reasonable protective steps, Ms A's deliberate misrepresentation and strong relationship with the scammer meant no further intervention would have prevented the loss. The complaint was not upheld as the payments were not covered by the CRM code and causation could not be established.
The Ombudsman's reasoning
The ombudsman found that while Barclays took reasonable and proportionate steps to protect Ms A through multiple interventions and scam warnings, Ms A failed to respond positively to these warnings and was not truthful about the involvement of a third party (the scammer) in directing the payments. The key issue was causation: even if Barclays should have intervened further, the ombudsman was not satisfied that any further intervention would have prevented the loss, given Ms A's strong relationship with the scammer, the coaching she received on how to respond to bank inquiries, and her deliberate misrepresentation of the payment purposes. Additionally, the payments were made to an account in Ms A's own name, so they were not covered by the CRM code, and Barclays could not have recovered the funds as they had already been used by Ms A as part of the scam.
How this compares
| Group | Decisions | Uphold rate |
|---|---|---|
| Barclays Bank UK PLC, all decisions | 11,138 | 21% |
| Current account, all decisions | 45,590 | 19% |
Source
Read the original decision on the Financial Ombudsman Service website