Not upheld: scam - investment fraud, failure to prevent payment complaint against Santander UK Plc
Financial Ombudsman decision DRN-6344942 of 2026-05-22T00:00:00+00:00. scam - investment fraud, failure to prevent payment complaint against Santander UK Plc. Outcome: Not upheld.
Decision detail
| Reference | DRN-6344942 |
|---|---|
| Decision date | 2026-05-22T00:00:00+00:00 |
| Firm | Santander UK Plc |
| Product | current account |
| Claim type | scam - investment fraud, failure to prevent payment |
| Outcome | Not upheld |
| Remedy | None. Complaint not upheld. No refund ordered. |
Summary
Mr Q complained that Santander should refund losses from an investment scam where he transferred funds between January and February 2025 to accounts he controlled before forwarding them to the scammer. Santander intervened twice, providing warnings about crypto investment scams and safe accounts, but Mr Q provided reassuring information claiming the accounts were his own and he had 10 years of crypto experience. The ombudsman found that while Santander had general obligations to monitor for fraud, Mr Q authorised the payments and the bank provided proportionate warnings. Crucially, the ombudsman found that even if Santander should have intervened further, it would not have prevented the loss because Mr Q had built significant trust with the scammer and was receiving step-by-step coaching, as evidenced by scam chat communications. Multiple interventions from three different financial institutions with clear warnings failed to deter him, demonstrating the scammer's influence was too strong to be overcome by further bank questioning. The complaint was not upheld.
The Ombudsman's reasoning
The ombudsman found that while Santander had obligations to monitor accounts and intervene in suspicious transactions, consumers are generally liable for authorised payments under PSR 2017. The key issue was causation - whether Santander's failure to intervene further would have prevented the loss. The ombudsman concluded that even if Santander should have done more, it would not have made a difference because: (1) Mr Q provided reassuring information during interventions claiming the account was his own and he had crypto experience; (2) Mr Q had built significant trust with the scammer and was receiving step-by-step coaching; (3) multiple interventions from three different institutions with clear warnings did not deter him; and (4) the scammer's influence was too strong to be overcome by further questioning. The ombudsman also noted that even if Santander had intervened, no funds would have remained in Santander's system as Mr Q transferred them to his own accounts first.
How this compares
| Group | Decisions | Uphold rate |
|---|---|---|
| Santander UK Plc, all decisions | 14,445 | 22% |
Source
Read the original decision on the Financial Ombudsman Service website