Partially upheld: failure to prevent authorised push payment scam through inadequate fraud monitoring and intervention complaint against Barclays Bank UK PLC

Decision detail

Summary

R, a company directed by Mr H, lost £42,193.53 (47 × £901.99) to a scam involving payments to money remittance firm W in September 2024. Mr H received a scam call and, though unable to recall full details due to a health incident, must have shared security codes and information enabling the fraudsters to register a new device and set up Apple Pay. Barclays confirmed the first payment via text but failed to intervene when a highly suspicious pattern emerged: 47 identical payments to an unfamiliar money remittance service funded by an unusual £80,000 personal transfer. The ombudsman found Barclays should have spoken directly to Mr H by the fourth payment to probe the legitimacy of this activity, which would likely have uncovered the scam. However, Mr H also bore responsibility for overlooking red flags and enabling the fraud. The complaint was partially upheld, requiring Barclays to refund 50% of losses from the fourth payment onwards with interest.

The Ombudsman's reasoning

While the payments were deemed authorised because Mr H must have taken steps to enable them (sharing codes and security information), Barclays should have intervened by the fourth payment when a clear suspicious pattern emerged. The combination of an unusually large personal transfer, 47 identical transactions to a money remittance service (uncharacteristic for R), and rapid succession of payments created a clear fraud risk. A direct conversation with Mr H at this point would likely have uncovered the scam, as he would have struggled to justify such unusual business activity. However, Mr H also bears responsibility for overlooking red flags in the scam call and taking steps that enabled the fraud, so liability should be shared equally.

How this compares

Source

Read the original decision on the Financial Ombudsman Service website