Upheld: Failure to prevent APP scam / Inadequate fraud detection and intervention complaint against Barclays Bank UK PLC
Financial Ombudsman decision DRN-6331989 of 2026-05-05T00:00:00+00:00. Failure to prevent APP scam / Inadequate fraud detection and intervention complaint against Barclays Bank UK PLC. Outcome: Upheld.
Decision detail
| Reference | DRN-6331989 |
|---|---|
| Decision date | 2026-05-05T00:00:00+00:00 |
| Firm | Barclays Bank UK PLC |
| Product | current account |
| Claim type | Failure to prevent APP scam / Inadequate fraud detection and intervention |
| Outcome | Upheld |
| Remedy | Barclays Bank UK PLC must: (1) reimburse 50% of losses from 30 October 2024 onwards (total loss from that date: £65,355); (2) pay 8% simple interest per annum on the reimbursed amount calculated from date of loss to date of settlement; (3) provide tax deduction certificate if requested by Mr D for HMRC purposes |
Summary
Mr D lost £68,110 to a cryptocurrency investment scam after being unexpectedly added to a WhatsApp group and introduced to fraudulent investment platforms M and C. He made 14 payments to his own cryptocurrency wallet which were then transferred to scammers. Barclays declined to reimburse the losses. The ombudsman upheld the complaint, finding that Barclays should have intervened when Mr D made a £9,000 payment on 30 October 2024, which was significantly larger than previous payments and should have triggered fraud enquiries and a tailored warning about cryptocurrency scams. However, the ombudsman found Mr D also negligent for not conducting due diligence after a prior loss and for accepting unrealistic promised returns of 60-150%. Barclays was ordered to reimburse 50% of losses from 30 October 2024 onwards plus 8% interest, reflecting shared responsibility.
The Ombudsman's reasoning
While customers are generally responsible for authorised payments under law, Barclays had a contractual right and regulatory duty to intervene where fraud was suspected. Taking into account FCA principles, regulatory guidance, the BSI Code, and good industry practice, Barclays should have monitored for unusual transactions and multi-stage fraud risks. The £9,000 payment on 30 October 2024 was significantly larger than previous payments to a cryptocurrency provider and should have triggered enquiries and a tailored warning about cryptocurrency investment scams. Had Barclays provided such a warning highlighting common scam features (unexpected WhatsApp contact, unrealistic returns), Mr D would likely have investigated further and discovered the scam. However, Mr D also bore responsibility for not conducting due diligence after already experiencing a loss from platform M, and for not questioning unrealistic returns of 60-150%. Therefore, liability should be shared equally at 50% each.
How this compares
| Group | Decisions | Uphold rate |
|---|---|---|
| Barclays Bank UK PLC, all decisions | 11,165 | 22% |
Source
Read the original decision on the Financial Ombudsman Service website