Not upheld: scam liability - bank impersonation fraud complaint against Wise Payments Limited

Decision detail

Summary

Mrs Y fell victim to a bank impersonation scam in February 2024 where scammers instructed her to open a Wise account and transfer £42,650 to protect her money. Wise displayed scam warnings and asked intervention questions, but Mrs Y, coached by the scammers, answered that she was sending money to herself and denied being pressured. The ombudsman found that Wise's interventions were proportionate and that the subsequent payments did not follow typical fraud patterns. Critically, the ombudsman concluded that even if Wise had escalated to human intervention, the scammers had demonstrated sufficient ability to impersonate Mrs Y (as evidenced by her bank's intervention) that they would likely have succeeded in impersonating her again, making it impossible to establish that further intervention would have prevented the scam.

The Ombudsman's reasoning

The ombudsman found that while Wise was obliged to follow Mrs Y's payment instructions, it had a regulatory duty to monitor for fraud risks. However, the ombudsman concluded that Wise's intervention on Payment 1 was proportionate and that the subsequent payments did not follow known fraud patterns (they were spread out over hours and lower in value than Payment 1). Critically, even if Wise had escalated to human intervention, causation could not be established because the scammers had demonstrated sufficient ability to impersonate Mrs Y (as evidenced by her bank's intervention) that they would likely have successfully impersonated her again. Mrs Y was following step-by-step guidance from the scammers and would likely have relied on what she believed was her trusted bank rather than disclosing the true purpose to Wise.

How this compares

Source

Read the original decision on the Financial Ombudsman Service website