Partially upheld: failure to prevent investment scam fraud complaint against Metro Bank PLC
Financial Ombudsman decision DRN-6304999 of 2026-05-13T00:00:00+00:00. failure to prevent investment scam fraud complaint against Metro Bank PLC. Outcome: Partially upheld.
Decision detail
| Reference | DRN-6304999 |
|---|---|
| Decision date | 2026-05-13T00:00:00+00:00 |
| Firm | Metro Bank PLC |
| Product | current account |
| Claim type | failure to prevent investment scam fraud |
| Outcome | Partially upheld |
| Remedy | Metro Bank PLC must refund 50% of transaction 3 (£9,880.57 = £4,940.29) and 25% of transactions 4, 5, 6 and 7 (£4,576.07 × 0.25 = £1,144.02; £1,000 × 0.25 = £250; £3,503.04 × 0.25 = £875.76; £1,028 × 0.25 = £257). Add 8% simple interest annually from transaction date to settlement date, less any tax lawfully deductible. |
Summary
Mr M lost £31,297.19 to an investment scam through seven international transfers made between February and March 2025. He complained that Metro Bank failed to prevent the fraud by not intervening on suspicious transactions. The ombudsman found that Metro should have stopped payment three (the second large payment to a new overseas payee within a short period) and provided appropriate warnings about investment scam risks. However, Mr M was found to bear contributory responsibility for his loss due to granting the scammer remote access to his account and allowing them to open financial products in his name. The complaint was upheld in part, requiring Metro to refund 50% of payment three and 25% of payments four through seven, plus 8% simple interest.
The Ombudsman's reasoning
Metro had a fair and reasonable obligation to monitor accounts for unusual transactions and intervene where appropriate. By payment three, the pattern of large payments to a new overseas payee within a short timeframe should have triggered intervention and appropriate warnings about investment scam risks. Had Metro provided such warnings highlighting red flags (social media investments, remote access software, unrealistic returns), Mr M would likely not have proceeded. However, Mr M bears contributory responsibility for giving remote access to his account and allowing the scammer to take out financial products in his name, demonstrating insufficient questioning of legitimacy. Therefore, liability should be shared 50/50 after the point Metro should have intervened.
How this compares
| Group | Decisions | Uphold rate |
|---|---|---|
| Metro Bank PLC, all decisions | 1,221 | 30% |
Source
Read the original decision on the Financial Ombudsman Service website