Veste

Partially upheld: scam / fraud - failure to intervene in suspicious payment pattern complaint against HSBC UK Bank Plc

Financial Ombudsman decision DRN-6286048 of 2026-05-05T00:00:00+00:00. scam / fraud - failure to intervene in suspicious payment pattern complaint against HSBC UK Bank Plc. Outcome: Partially upheld.

Decision detail

ReferenceDRN-6286048
Decision date2026-05-05T00:00:00+00:00
FirmHSBC UK Bank Plc
Productcurrent account
Claim typescam / fraud - failure to intervene in suspicious payment pattern
OutcomePartially upheld
RemedyHSBC UK Bank Plc must: (1) Refund £18,671.33 (representing 50% of the outstanding loss from the twelfth payment onwards after proportionate deduction of £498 returns); (2) Pay 8% simple interest per year from the date of each payment to settlement date, excluding interest on the final £5,300 funded by borrowed money from family member.

Summary

Mr I lost £40,740.23 to a sophisticated task-based job scam after making nearly 50 debit card payments between September 3-27, 2025. The ombudsman found that HSBC should have intervened at the twelfth payment, as the pattern of twelve payments in three days with identical amounts made minutes apart and incrementally increasing values presented clear fraud indicators. However, Mr I also bore responsibility for not independently verifying the job despite multiple red flags including unsolicited contact, unrealistic pay, requirement to pay to earn, and instruction to mislead his bank. The complaint was partially upheld with a 50/50 liability split, resulting in HSBC being ordered to refund £18,671.33 plus 8% simple interest from payment dates to settlement.

The Ombudsman's reasoning

HSBC should have intervened at the twelfth payment due to the suspicious pattern of activity (twelve payments in three days, identical amounts made minutes apart, incrementally increasing values). A proportionate intervention involving contact with Mr I would likely have uncovered the scam. However, Mr I also bears responsibility for not adequately protecting himself, as there were multiple red flags: unsolicited WhatsApp contact, unrealistic remuneration for simple tasks, requirement to pay to earn money, instruction to mislead his bank, and lack of employment contract. Mr I questioned the job but relied on scammer reassurance rather than conducting independent research. A 50/50 split of liability is fair, reflecting both HSBC's failure to intervene and Mr I's failure to take protective steps despite clear warning signs.

How this compares

GroupDecisionsUphold rate
HSBC UK Bank Plc, all decisions7,53223%

Source

Read the original decision on the Financial Ombudsman Service website