Partially upheld: scam - failure to intervene and warn on suspicious payments complaint against Zempler Bank Limited
Financial Ombudsman decision DRN-6198499 of 2026-05-28T00:00:00+00:00. scam - failure to intervene and warn on suspicious payments complaint against Zempler Bank Limited. Outcome: Partially upheld.
Decision detail
| Reference | DRN-6198499 |
|---|---|
| Decision date | 2026-05-28T00:00:00+00:00 |
| Firm | Zempler Bank Limited |
| Product | current account |
| Claim type | scam - failure to intervene and warn on suspicious payments |
| Outcome | Partially upheld |
| Remedy | Refund 50% of losses from payment 2 onwards (total £12,207.495). Add 8% simple interest from date of each payment to date of settlement. |
Summary
Mrs T lost £24,779.99 to a job scam between July 2025, making 7 payments to crypto exchanges after being offered commission for completing online tasks. She was repeatedly asked for more money before realising the fraud. Zempler initially refused a refund, later offering only 50% of losses to one exchange. The ombudsman upheld the complaint in part, finding Zempler should have intervened and warned Mrs T by the second payment (£4,000) as it was large, to a high-risk beneficiary, and by 2025 firms were aware of multi-stage crypto scams. A proper intervention would likely have uncovered the scam. However, both parties had opportunities to identify the fraud before payment 2, so liability is shared 50/50 from payment 2 onwards, with 8% interest added.
The Ombudsman's reasoning
The ombudsman found Mrs T was victim of a scam and that Zempler should have intervened by payment 2 (£4,000 on 14 July 2025). The payment was very large for Mrs T, to a high-risk beneficiary (crypto exchange), and by 2025 firms should have been aware of multi-stage crypto scams. A warning and probing questions would likely have uncovered the scam, as Mrs T was not being coached to lie and would have answered honestly about sending money to a crypto wallet for a commissioned job. However, both parties had opportunities to uncover the scam before payment 2, so liability should be shared 50/50 from payment 2 onwards. Payments to D are linked to the same scam based on proximity and evidence of Mrs T's attempts to raise the scam with D regarding the same wallet address.
How this compares
| Group | Decisions | Uphold rate |
|---|---|---|
| Zempler Bank Limited, all decisions | 89 | 33% |
Source
Read the original decision on the Financial Ombudsman Service website