Not upheld: scam/fraud - failure to intervene in authorised payments complaint against Nationwide Building Society

Decision detail

Summary

Mr S lost approximately £47,745.76 to a scam where fraudsters posing as wealth management providers convinced him to send 36 payments from his Nationwide account to his own account with another firm, which were then moved to the scammers' cryptocurrency wallet. Nationwide declined to reimburse him because the payments went to a longstanding payee account he regularly used legitimately. The ombudsman found that although Nationwide should have fraud monitoring systems in place, the scam activity resembled Mr S's genuine payment patterns, making intervention difficult to justify. The ombudsman concluded that even if Nationwide had intervened in April 2025, Mr S would likely have provided the same misleading explanation he gave to firm B (that he was sending money to himself in Cambodia), which Nationwide would probably have accepted given the account history, meaning intervention would have been unsuccessful.

The Ombudsman's reasoning

Although Mr S authorised the payments under Payment Services Regulations and is presumed liable, the ombudsman considered whether Nationwide should have intervened. The ombudsman found that while Nationwide should have monitoring systems in place, the scam activity was largely similar to Mr S's genuine account activity, making it difficult to identify an obvious intervention point. Even if Nationwide had intervened in April 2025 (the earliest reasonable point), the ombudsman inferred from firm B's experience that Mr S would have provided the same misleading explanation (sending money to himself in Cambodia) and Nationwide would likely have accepted this explanation given the account history of legitimate payments to the same payee. The ombudsman concluded that proportionate intervention would not have uncovered the scam.

How this compares

Source

Read the original decision on the Financial Ombudsman Service website