Partially upheld: failure to protect vulnerable customer from gambling harm; irresponsible payment processing complaint against Revolut Ltd
Financial Ombudsman decision DRN-6130570 of 2026-04-28T00:00:00+00:00. failure to protect vulnerable customer from gambling harm; irresponsible payment processing complaint against Revolut Ltd. Outcome: Partially upheld.
Decision detail
| Reference | DRN-6130570 |
|---|---|
| Decision date | 2026-04-28T00:00:00+00:00 |
| Firm | Revolut Ltd |
| Product | payment account |
| Claim type | failure to protect vulnerable customer from gambling harm; irresponsible payment processing |
| Outcome | Partially upheld |
| Remedy | Revolut Ltd must refund: (1) all payments to Merchant A from and including 25 April 2025 at 7:53am; (2) all payments to Merchant B from and including 6 May 2025 at 11:37am; (3) the payment on 31 December 2024. Revolut must also add 8% simple interest per annum calculated from the date each payment debited the account until settlement is paid. |
Summary
Miss E, who suffers from a gambling addiction and is registered with Gamstop, informed Revolut of her vulnerability in October 2024. Between December 2024 and June 2025, she made numerous payments to unlicensed overseas gambling websites using merchant codes that obscured the gambling nature of the transactions. The ombudsman found that Revolut should have intervened when Miss E made over 60 payments to Merchant A within a month, completely depleting her account by 25 April 2025, and similarly concerning patterns with Merchant B starting 1 May 2025. The ombudsman upheld the complaint in part, ordering Revolut to refund payments from the identified trigger points (25 April for Merchant A, 6 May for Merchant B) plus one earlier payment from 31 December 2024, with 8% simple interest per annum.
The Ombudsman's reasoning
The ombudsman found that Revolut was required under FCA Principle 6 to treat Miss E fairly given her known vulnerability to gambling harm. Although payment service providers must generally process authorised payments, this obligation must be balanced against the duty to treat vulnerable customers fairly. Given that Revolut knew of Miss E's gambling addiction and the pattern of payments showed high frequency and velocity that depleted her account, Revolut should have intervened at specific trigger points. A proportionate intervention would have created a pause between the psychological trigger and the payment, allowing Miss E to regain control. The ombudsman agreed with the Investigator that intervention at the point when Miss E's account was emptied (25 April for Merchant A) and at the first concerning payment to Merchant B (6 May at 11:37am) would likely have reduced financial harm. The payment on 31 December 2024 that was initially blocked for fraud but processed shortly after should also have been prevented.
How this compares
| Group | Decisions | Uphold rate |
|---|---|---|
| Revolut Ltd, all decisions | 3,790 | 18% |
Source
Read the original decision on the Financial Ombudsman Service website