Not upheld: Authorised Push Payment (APP) scam - refund claim under the Reimbursement Rules complaint against Barclays Bank UK PLC

Decision detail

Summary

Mrs C fell victim to a remote job opportunity scam in early 2025, making approximately £35,000 in payments via her Barclays account. After initially making payments via a cryptocurrency wallet, she reported the scheme as a scam to Barclays and her son. However, after being reassured by an anonymous person in the scam group chat, she continued making further payments, including four transfers to third parties, selecting inaccurate payment purposes and providing misleading explanations to Barclays. When Barclays declined to refund her losses, Mrs C complained to the Financial Ombudsman Service. The ombudsman found that while the four third-party transfers were covered by the Reimbursement Rules (which came into force on 7 October 2024), Barclays could rely on the Consumer Standard of Caution Exception because Mrs C failed with gross negligence to have regard to Barclays' interventions. The ombudsman concluded that Mrs C deliberately provided inaccurate information to avoid triggering further interventions, the scam was not particularly complex, and she was primarily motivated by a desire to recover losses rather than being under the thrall of the scammer. The complaint was not upheld.

The Ombudsman's reasoning

The ombudsman applied the Reimbursement Rules, which require UK payment service providers to reimburse APP scam victims unless an exception applies. For the four third-party transfers, the ombudsman found they met the criteria for coverage under the Rules. However, Barclays could rely on the Consumer Standard of Caution (CSOC) Exception, specifically the Intervention Standard, because Mrs C failed with gross negligence to have regard to Barclays' interventions. The ombudsman found that: (1) Mrs C had already reported the scheme as a scam to Barclays; (2) Barclays provided specific warnings about the risks, including not to make transfers to unknown people and to select accurate payment purposes; (3) Mrs C deliberately provided inaccurate payment purpose selections and misleading explanations to Barclays, apparently to avoid triggering further interventions; (4) the scam itself was not particularly complex - it was based on a simple premise that Mrs C could earn money by completing tasks while also needing to send payments; (5) Mrs C was motivated primarily by a desire to recover her earlier losses rather than being under the thrall of the scammer; (6) it was unreasonable for Mrs C to rely on the word of an anonymous person from the chat over the advice of both her son and Barclays. The ombudsman concluded that Mrs C showed a serious disregard for obvious risks and Barclays' attempts to intervene. For the remaining payments sent via Mrs C's own accounts, they were not covered by the Reimbursement Rules, and the ombudsman found Barclays had not missed a clear opportunity to prevent the scam, as Mrs C was persistent in making payments, used different accounts when blocked, and did not disclose the true destination of funds.

How this compares

Source

Read the original decision on the Financial Ombudsman Service website