Not upheld: scam / fraud - recovery of funds lost to employment scam complaint against Revolut Ltd
Financial Ombudsman decision DRN-5909727 of 2026-05-07T00:00:00+00:00. scam / fraud - recovery of funds lost to employment scam complaint against Revolut Ltd. Outcome: Not upheld.
Decision detail
| Reference | DRN-5909727 |
|---|---|
| Decision date | 2026-05-07T00:00:00+00:00 |
| Firm | Revolut Ltd |
| Product | Current account |
| Claim type | scam / fraud - recovery of funds lost to employment scam |
| Outcome | Not upheld |
| Remedy | None. Complaint not upheld. No reimbursement ordered. |
Summary
Mr H lost £6,300 to an employment scam through 12 push to card payments made from his Revolut account between 5-16 May 2025. Revolut provided new beneficiary warnings and, on 7 May 2025, identified suspicious activity and provided a tailored warning specific to job scams. Mr H initially provided truthful information but subsequently gave inaccurate answers to Revolut's fraud detection questions under scammer coaching, with evidence showing scammers provided him screenshots instructing how to circumvent the system. The ombudsman found Revolut's intervention was proportionate and that push to card payments are not covered by the Reimbursement Rules. Although Mr H claimed vulnerability and that human intervention could have prevented the loss, the ombudsman concluded Revolut was unaware of vulnerabilities beforehand and that Mr H's determination to follow scammer instructions despite warnings meant prevention was unlikely. The complaint was not upheld.
The Ombudsman's reasoning
The ombudsman found that push to card payments are not covered by the Reimbursement Rules or CRM Code. Revolut provided proportionate intervention through automated questions and tailored scam warnings specific to job scams. Although Mr H initially provided truthful information and received relevant warnings, he subsequently provided inaccurate information under scammer coaching to circumvent Revolut's fraud detection systems. The evidence of scammer-provided instructions showing Mr H how to evade detection demonstrates he was determined to make the payments despite warnings. Even if Revolut had provided human intervention via phone rather than chat, it would not have prevented the loss given Mr H's determination and the scammer's coaching. Push to card payments cannot be recovered through standard chargeback or fund recovery processes, leaving very little chance of recovery. Vulnerability considerations do not apply as Revolut was unaware of vulnerabilities prior to the scam and the payments fall outside the CRM Code scope.
How this compares
| Group | Decisions | Uphold rate |
|---|---|---|
| Revolut Ltd, all decisions | 3,790 | 18% |
| Current account, all decisions | 45,590 | 19% |
Source
Read the original decision on the Financial Ombudsman Service website